Interview by Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov to «Krasnaya Zvezda» newspaper

As is known, there were previously a total of five nuclear power plants on the territory of Ukraine. Currently, of these, the Chernobyl nuclear power plant is in a muffled state after the accident at its fourth reactor unit in 1986, and the Zaporozhskaya nuclear power plant came under full control of Russia when the Zaporozhskaya region became part of the Russian Federation in October last year.

 

What is the attitude of the current Ukrainian leadership towards ensuring the nuclear safety and security of the four nuclear power plants, which are currently fully controlled by Ukraine?

 

The specialized Ukrainian structures are engaged in the issues of ensuring nuclear safety and security at four nuclear power plants under their control in the usual mode. As necessary, they apply through the IAEA or directly to foreign suppliers for assistance in obtaining materials and equipment necessary for the uninterrupted operation of these stations.

 

Recently, the IAEA published a regular report on the topic of ensuring nuclear safety and security on Ukrainian territory in the amount of 52 pages. What are its main features and how does it differ from the previous Agency report on this subject, which was published in September 2022?

 

What concerns the Zaporozhskaya NPP, the IAEA report once again turned out to be not entirely objective. Information about the state of affairs at the NPP is presented in it one-sidedly. The report gives the impression that Russia is often to blame for problems at the plant. If there are some positive aspects, then only impersonal: the problem has been solved. There is no mention of the fact that it was solved thanks to Russian efforts. We pointed out all these and other absurdities when discussing this document at the March session of the IAEA Board of Governors. We emphasized that weexpected better and more objective information on the presence of the Agency's experts at ZNPP, who have been there for the seventh month already. We will continue to seek to correct obvious distortions.

 

In your interviews to the Russian media, you repeatedly drew attention to the fact that the IAEA was convinced that, for example, the ZaporozhskayaNPP was repeatedly shelled by the Ukrainian side, but in its public reports, this international body avoided these facts, that is, it did not designate a violator of security of such a specific object. Why is the IAEA still not naming such violators? Is it fair? Moreover, such facts can be easily verified by the vectors of shelling from the Ukrainian side using radars and other reconnaissance means, by fragments of exploding artillery shells and missiles launched from Ukrainian territory, as well as by other well-known methods.

 

Indeed, the Agency has never named the party responsible for the shelling of the ZNPP and the adjacent territory, although they know perfectly well that the Ukrainian side is responsible for this. The Secretariat of the Agency explains its silence on this matter by the absence in its mandate of the so-called attributive functions, that is, the functions of identifying the guilty party. The IAEA Charter does not really provide for this. This question, for all its seemingly obvious, is really difficult. When Western countries needed to endow the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with attributive functions to use it for anti-Syrian purposes, they had to push such a decision through the Conference of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, in violation of existing rules and procedures. We are trying to fill this gap in the IAEA within the framework of the possible creation of a nuclear safety and security protection zone at the ZNPP. We insist that the IAEA experts at the NPPshould at least register the direction from which the attack was carried out.

 

The IAEA Director General is actively promoting his initiative to ensure the nuclear safety and security protection zone at the ZNPP specifically. What is the essence of his proposal? Does his initiative involve extending it to other nuclear power plants controlled by Kiev? Are there any negative elements in it that cannot be realized?

 

Answering your question briefly, I can say that the creation of a nuclear and safety and security protection zone at the Zaporozhskaya NPP implies a complete rejection of any attacks on the Zaporozhskaya NPP or from its territory. In other words, the Ukrainian side must confirm that it will not carry out shelling of the ZNPP. We are easily ready to assume obligations not to carry out attacks from the territory of the NPP. We have never done this and do not plan to do so. By the way, the plant does not even have heavy weapons that could be used to attack Ukrainian soldiers on the other side of the reservoir.

 

The discussion at the March session of the IAEA Board of Governors showed that an obstacle to the creation of a protection zone is the position of Ukraine and the United States, which are not yet ready to support Rafael Grossi's initiative.

 

Distribution of the initiative of the Director General of the Agency to the nuclear power plants controlled by Kiev, at least for the time being, is not expected. Ukrainians do not ask for this. Apparently, because we have never shelled nuclear power plants.

 

Not so long ago, the question arose of the rotation of IAEA inspectors at the ZNPP, which was given special importance in the NATO and EU countries, although it clearly did not deserve it. In the end, it was positively resolved without much effort. Was there again an attempt to create a special information occasion around him?

 

If there was such an attempt, it proved to be useless. At the March session of the Board of Governors, we emphasized that the rotation dates were postponed several times, but by no means through our fault or initiative. The Russian military, which ensures the rotation of international personnel, invariably acted clearly and quickly. The repeated postponement and even the route of rotation each time occurred at the initiative of either the Ukrainian side or the UN Department of Safety and Security, which, in accordance with the rules adopted in the UN system, is involved in ensuring the safe movement of international personnel in unsafe areas.