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Dear Mr. Chairman,

We would like to assure you that the Russian delegation will contribute to the constructive work of the 53rd session of the Working Group B (WGB) of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission opened today.

Dear Executive Secretary,

We appreciate the detailed report on verification-related activities of the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission for the period from January to June 2019.

We also express our gratitude to the US delegation for its condolences with regard to the tragic incident in the Arkhangelsk region that caused death of Russian nuclear scientists.

Dear Mr. Chairman,

There are many important goals which we need to address together. The main one is preparation for the entry into force of the CTBT. Let's focus on its achievement.

We recognize that the PrepCom’s capabilities are expanding every year as well as capacity of the Organization itself. Meanwhile the prospects of the Treaty do not allow those capabilities to be fully operationalized. However, this is not a reason to take up issues that are not related to the subject of the Treaty and the mandate of the Commission. Tracking military activities, as well as consequences of any events and incidents which are not related to nuclear testing, is unacceptable. We are pleased and encouraged that the PTS clearly understands this and acts accordingly in its daily work.

We should not also forget that transfer of data from the IMS stations to the International Data Center (IDC) is still a purely voluntary and will remain so until the CTBT comes into force. Until this time any requests for mandatory nature of the transfer of information to the IDC are baseless and illegitimate.

The tragic accident that had occurred has nothing to do with nuclear tests and does not apply to the subject of the CTBT (para 2 of Article IV). Paragraphs 7, 8, 9 of Article IV of the CTBT reserve the right of states to take measures to protect the confidentiality of any information related to civil and military activities and facilities obtained during verification activities.

In this regard, we would like to ask what are the basis and reasons for requesting us to provide information on what happened on August 8?

We also note that there is no health hazard or any other danger for the population after the incident of August 8 near Severodvinsk. According to the Emergency Ministry of Russia for the Arkhangelsk region, the radiation background in the mentioned area is at ordinary natural level. This is confirmed by the data of the Automated Radiation Monitoring System (ASKRO). The highest values detected on the day of the incident, August 8, were 1.78 microsievert per hour, which is equivalent to the amount of radiation absorbed  during the tooth X-ray procedure. The incident did not result in a transboundary transmission of radioactive substances. There is no environmental disaster in the area of the incident or above it, as some media has claimed.

Mr. Chairman,

For those who are especially curious I can add that the tests conducted at the military site near Severodvinsk on August 8 are related to the development of weapon as one of the counter measures in response to unilateral US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Treaty in 2002.

I should also mention that the statement by the US delegation came as real surprise. It recalls me the title of one famous old and kind American movie "Look, who is talking”.

How can the one, pursuing the policy of refusing to ratify the CTBT, require others to comply with the Treaty’s provisions or accuse others of alleged non-compliance and of all that we heard today? This is clear twist of real reasons why the CTBT has not yet entered into force and its verification mechanism is in provisional operation and testing mode.

In conclusion, we would also like to note that groundless debates on this matter do not add arguments and incentives to the remaining countries that have not yet signed and/or ratified the Treaty, to do so without any delay.

Thank you for attention.