CTBTO

STATEMENT OF THE HEAD OF THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

TO THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN VIENNA

H.E. MIKHAIL ULYANOV

Mr. Chairperson, Mr. Executive Secretary,

I would like to extend my greetings to you and to assure you of my delegation’s readiness to work for successful outcome of the 52nd session of the PrepCom.

We welcome the ratification of the CTBT by Zimbabwe. But regretfully this positive step forward by one more country will not be able to overcome the unfortunate situation around the Treaty. We must note that 7 years have passed since Indonesia ratified the Treaty, and the number of countries whose ratifications are required for the Treaty to enter into force continues to be 8 States.

The strongest blow to the Treaty came when the United States refused to ratify the CTBT and decided to maintain ready its potential for possible resumption of nuclear testing. Instead of reconsidering this reckless decision, the United States recently released into the public fake news on Russia's alleged “non-compliance” with its voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing. Moreover, this canard exists in two versions. At the beginning - it was in the last days of May - a high-ranking Pentagon official announced that Russia had probably carried out such tests. Then, on June 13, another statement was made on behalf of the US government, in which nuclear tests were already mentioned without any reservations and stated as an accomplished fact. We would like to request the distinguished delegation of the United States to explain the reasons for such a rapid evolution of assessments - from assumption to peremptory statement. We would also like the US delegation to provide concrete facts that would substantiate the statements that the US made. If the US does not provide them, our overseas partners should apologize to Russia and disavow their statements.

It should be noted that the United States has already made a habit of making serious accusations against other states without providing any evidence. The fact that this is even possible at all indicates a significant degradation of political culture and ethics in international affairs. The principle of presumption of innocence is absolutely applicable to the sphere of international relations, and ignoring of it is fraught with big problems. Our American partners either do not understand or they do not want to understand this. Unfortunately, they have not yet drawn the necessary conclusions from the shameful story of Saddam Hussein’s “weapons of mass destruction.”

So, the question naturally arises - why is this being done? By all appearances, in this way, the US is seeking to distract attention from its destructive line with respect to the CTBT. Washington seems to be seriously considering a possibility of nuclear tests resumption. According to the US Department of Energy, Washington would need from 6 to 10 months in order to prepare a “simple” nuclear test and from 24 to 36 months in order to organize a full-scale nuclear test. This is the official data. It is not excluded that now Washington is looking for excuses to abandon its own moratorium and somehow “point a finger” at the Russian Federation. But perhaps the situation is even worse than that. As it is known, in recent years the United States has set a course towards destruction of many agreements in the field of arms control and non-proliferation one after another. One of the most recent example is the Treaty On The Elimination Of Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty). Washington accused Russia of violating the INF Treaty, but was unable to provide any proof. But Washington seems almost have reached its goal. The INF Treaty will cease to exist at the beginning of August of this year when the US leaves it. So, does CTBT really become the next target to be ruined? Let’s hope, it does not. We will closely monitor the US actions in order to take timely measures, if necessary, to save the Treaty.

To justify the United States someone can refer to their significant financial and technological contribution to the development of the CTBT verification mechanism. This is true, but a question then arises: how does this combine with the refusal to ratify the CTBT? What is this - philanthropy or an attempt to use an international mechanism to achieve purely national goals without taking any legal obligations? There is a lot of food for thought here.

We believe it is necessary to take into account the specifics of the current situation when we work on the text of the Final Declaration of the Conference on Facilitating Entry Into Force of the Treaty (New York, September 25). The desire of some countries to ignore the today’s realities and at the same time to transfer the main responsibility of what is happening to the CTBT to the DPRK demonstrates their biased and one-sided approach to reality and clearly is not consistent to efforts to bring the Treaty into force. We have made the relevant proposals to the co-chairs of the upcoming Conference.

Mr. Chairperson,

We welcome the appointment of the Permanent Representatives of Algeria and Germany as co-chairs of the upcoming CTBT Article XIV Conference. We attach great importance to the process of facilitating the entry into force of the Treaty and, on our part, we stand ready to provide the necessary support to the co-chairs and to actively participate in drafting the Final Declaration of the Conference. At the same time, we once again call that today's realities should be taken into account when preparing for the Conference.

Mr. Chairperson,

We note the improvement in the payment of contributions. Payment of contributions on time is one of the main components of State’s responsibility under the Treaty. The traditionally high level of budget implementation requires financial discipline both from the Secretariat when planning and spending resources, and from Member States of the Commission in terms of contribution payments. We call upon States to fulfill their financial obligations in full and in a timely manner.

Mr. Chairperson,

We note with satisfaction that the equipment storage and maintenance facility has been constructed. Three years ago we just began discussing the possibility of having a permanent storage facility, and we sought funds for its construction. The members of the Commission resolved that this was an important task and relinquished 2014 cash surplus for the construction of the facility. We proceed from the fact that as stated in the report of the 52nd session of the WGB the On-Site Inspection Division will continue to be the major user of this facility and that it will be managed accordingly. The Russian delegation will be delighted to be able to participate in the opening ceremony in Seibersdorf on June 19.

Thank you.