CTBTO

Distinguished Moderator, distinguished Mr. Executive Secretary, ladies and gentlemen,

First of all I would like to thank the Executive Secretary for the kind invitation to speak to the participants of this important meeting. Since I was part of the negotiation of the Treaty and the creation of the Preparatory Commission I value this opportunity to observe the inner workings of the PC and to feel firsthand the problems that the Treaty and the PC are facing 20 years after its signature.

My country is a strong believer in the CTBT. We were an active participant at all stages of its inception: from the first bilateral with the US in Moscow when we agreed the negotiating mandate for the CD Special Committee, for the adoption of which we later worked together in Geneva, to the adoption of the resolution to establish the CTBTO and its Preparatory Commission in November of 1996. Since then our position remains the same, as President Putin said in April last year: “The Treaty constitutes the most important instrument for limiting the nuclear arms and for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and plays a significant role in strengthening international security”. We ratified the CTBT in 2000 and consistently support it and the work of the PC, considering the Treaty’s entry into force as our priority task.

Last year marked the 20^th anniversary since the Treaty was opened for signature in New York on 24 September 1996. On that occasion the US President Bill Clinton, who signed it on behalf of the United States, called it “the biggest prize in arms control”. But until now his country has failed to ratify it thus blocking with some others its entry into force. We can hardly call it a consistent position. As President Putin noted, the failure of the eight countries (out of 44 that are indispensable for that Treaty’s EIF) to become full parties to the Treaty causes our serious regret especially since some of them aspire for the leadership position in the world and claim almost special rights in the resolution of issues of global security.

At the same time one has to acknowledge that during these 20 years the Treaty has been outstandingly successful.

Today the Treaty has almost reached the universal status. It has been signed by 183 States of which 166 have ratified it. Those are the impressive figures. For a significant majority of States including Russia the CTBT has thus become an important element helping to maintain both national and international security.

Besides we are witnessing the establishment of an unprecedented in scope global monitoring system which is nearing its completion. Today there are only few who question the verifiability of the CTBT. The effectiveness and robustness of its verification mechanism have been more than once confirmed in practice including in January and September last year when the DPRK carried out its fourth and fifth nuclear tests. The integrated OSI field exercises in Jordan in 2014 demonstrated a serious progress in that area too. One should not fail to mention the unique monitoring capabilities provided by the CTBT in the civil and scientific fields. I can be frank with you and say that when we negotiated the Treaty we did not fully foresee this useful aspect of the future monitoring system. The later-on practice proved that the value of the Treaty is even more significant than what we thought while negotiating it.

Last September resolution 2310 of the UN Security Council on the question of the CTBT was adopted. It urges all States that have either not signed or not ratified the Treaty, particularly the eight remaining Annex 2 States, to do so without further delay. Russia voted in favor of this resolution.

It is important that this resolution does not impose on the States - parties any obligations that go outside those contained in the Treaty. While working on the text of the resolution we were guided by the fact that the CTBTO PC is the single competent body responsible for the development of the CTBT verification mechanism and for the preparation for the Treaty’s entry into force. Therefore any outside interference in the work of the PC even by the UN Security Council should be avoided. We are satisfied that as a result of intensive consultations it proved possible to develop a text fully consistent with this approach.

We feel it important that in parallel with the adoption of the Security Council resolution the P5 issued a joint statement on the CTBT. As far as I can remember it was the first such statement in support of the Treaty.

I am glad to use this opportunity to congratulate the distinguished Executive Secretary with his reelection to this high post last November. We are confident that under your leadership, Sir, the PC will continue to play a leading role in promoting the CTBT. We are pleased to be able to help you in this effort.

In April last year a seminar on the Treaty was organized in Moscow with the participation of the PC Secretariat members. In parallel Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov and Executive Secretary Zerbo published a joint article in support of the CTBT in some prominent Russian and American media.

We welcome the launching of a Youth Group under aegis of the Preparatory Commission which has been joined by students and alumni from different universities including Russian.

We are closely working with the Preparatory Commission in the build-up of the Russian segment of the IMS which is the second largest as far as the number of monitoring stations is concerned. Today in Russia 27 monitoring stations have been certified out of 32 provided for in the Treaty. In the coming years we plan to complete our IMS segment.

Mr. Moderator,

This is how we see the situation concerning the Treaty at present.

Now let me say a few words about our vision of the situation in the broader area of arms control and disarmament in particular in the nuclear field.

One has to acknowledge that within the past 30 years the arms race was not only stopped but turned back. Compared to the peak period of the Cold War, Russia’s strategic nuclear forces have been reduced by 85 per cent and tactical nuclear forces by 75 per cent. Moreover, Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons have been placed into a non-deployed status, which is the biggest de-alerting measure in the world history. To round out the picture I can mention that the number of deployed nuclear warheads has been reduced by 60 per cent or from 3,900 to 1,580 warheads in 2010 through 2015.

Nuclear disarmament is still underway. Russia keeps working to reduce its nuclear arsenals to the ceiling agreed in the new START Treaty by February 5, 2018. It is a very costly undertaking, yet we are doing this even despite the current economic challenges and sanctions imposed by the US and the EU. Russia is committed to the complete implementation of that Treaty.

In this context we do not agree with the recurring statements that nuclear disarmament is taking too long or is going through a deep crisis. We share in the belief in a nuclear-weapon-free world. The question, however, is how to move towards this goal without undermining strategic stability and jeopardizing the integrity of the NPT regime.

We believe that the priority today should not be put on the nuclear weapons ban, which is nothing but a PR scheme, but rather on the serious joint work to create conditions to facilitate genuine step-by-step nuclear disarmament.

Further steps aimed at nuclear arms reduction must be considered with due account for all factors influencing the strategic stability. They include plans by the United States to deploy its global missile defense system, efforts to create non­nuclear strategic offensive arms within the framework of implementation of the "prompt global strike” strategy, the danger of the weaponization of outer space, quantitative and qualitative imbalances in conventional arms, not to mention lack of progress in the ratification of the CTBT by the United States and other states from Annex 2, etc.

When we hear calls for further reduction of nuclear weapons in principle we have nothing against it. But we insist that in such a process all strategical factors influencing our security must be taken into consideration.

Meanwhile, one cannot overlook certain developments negatively affecting international security and the stability in the global strategic environment. This dangerous trend is a result of the aspiration of certain states and alliances to achieve military superiority that would allow them to use force or threat of force disregarding the limitations imposed by mutual deterrence.

We feel that our security is endangered by such policy.

The number one issue here is the missile defense effort by the former US Administration. The absence of a deployed effective missile defense system has ensured strategic stability for several decades until 2001, when the United States abandoned the ABM Treaty. Today the implementation of the US plans in this area is changing the nuclear deterrence situation: the BMD base in Romania has been officially activated; the similar base in Poland is under construction now; US “Aegis” destroyers continue their regular visits to the Black and Baltic seas. Now there are plans to deploy the US THAAD missile defense systems in South Korea, that is close to the Russian border in the Far East.

In other words, the efforts by the former US Administration to build a global missile defense system undermines the foundations of strategic stability, impedes nuclear disarmament and escalates tension at the regional and global levels. We have emphasized many times that we see such deployments as a direct threat to our strategic deterrence capability. But our concerns are ignored and this cannot be acceptable to us.

In addition, contrary to the provisions of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the Obama Administration decided to deploy the Mk-41 launching systems, which are used for launching intermediate-range missiles from sea platforms and which are banned from use on land, at missile defense sites in Europe. This constitutes a violation by the US of the INF Treaty. We do not hide this assessment and urge the US to return to the compliance with the INF Treaty.

Another issue of growing importance concerns the conventional precision- guided long-range weapons with high counterforce capacity comparable to that of nuclear weapons. Developments in this area such as the implementation of the “prompt global strike” program may seriously affect strategic deterrence and initiate a new round of the arms race.

In this regard we have to take into account the complicated situation in the sphere of European security. In its doctrine and force development policy, the North Atlantic Alliance increasingly relies on nuclear weapons undergoing serious modernization. New B61-12 nuclear bombs - which, even US experts admit, objectively lower the nuclear threshold - are about to enter service. Some experts of the former Washington Administration even hastened to describe these bombs as more “ethical” and more suitable for use.

One of the most acute problems in the area of nuclear arms control is that of the “common nuclear missions” carried out by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon NATO members. They include joint nuclear planning and training for the operational use of nuclear weapons involving airfields, planes and personnel from the non-nuclear weapon states. As we have emphasized on many occasions, this practice contradicts Articles I and II of the NPT. The way to resolve this problem is to put an end to “the common nuclear missions” and to withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons to the US national territory - the way Russia did with its tactical nuclear weapons in the early 1990-s.

In addition to its increasing reliance on nuclear weapons, NATO is also building up its military presence and military activity near our borders, attributing this to the purported need to “contain Russia”. We will continue to closely monitor these NATO’s actions as to their compliance with the Russia-NATO Founding Act of 1997.

We also have to take into account the growing risk of placing weapons in the outer space making it a new field of armed confrontation. These risks became more tangible since the former US Administration had refused even to discuss the non­deployment of orbital weapons or CBMs in the outer space.

I would also like to highlight the fact that other nuclear states continue to refuse any dialogue on limiting their nuclear weapons programs. Meanwhile, their aggregate nuclear capability is becoming comparable to the level Russia is going to reach under the New START Treaty. In our view when we reach the levels of the New START Treaty, the possibilities for further bilateral US-Russian reductions may be exhausted. It is necessary to seek possible ways to engage all other states with military nuclear capabilities in the nuclear disarmament process.

The nuclear arms control agenda is pretty busy and it contains a number of really complex issues. Unfortunately, certain nuclear weapon states tend to make things even more complicated by launching risky initiatives intended to please “nuclear abolitionists”. An example here is the initiative of the former US Administration to launch the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. Our point here is that issues covered by this initiative involve highly sensitive information related to nuclear weapons design, maintenance and storage arrangements that run counter the obligations under the NPT not to disclose sensitive nuclear military information to the non-nuclear weapon states.

Former US President Obama has declared disarmament one of his security policy priorities and even received the Nobel peace prize for this talk. But then he initiated the vastest modernization of nuclear arsenal since the end of the Cold War. It would cost the US budget 350 billion dollars in the next 10 years, and total expenses for this program may exceed one trillion dollars during 30 years.

Mr. Moderator,

Now if one would want to cast a glance upon a more general picture of the international security situation, one could notice, that it is at the lowest point since the end of World War II may be with the exception of the short period of the Caribbean crisis in 1962. The terrorism has become a real threat to the international security. Our attempts to establish a united front against terrorism have so far failed. In Syria for example the priority for the former US Administration was the “regime change” in Damascus rather than the eradication of the terrorist groups like the so-called Islamic State or Jabhat-Al-Nusra.

The economic sanctions imposed by the West on the economic relations with Russia have a parallel only with the 20’s and early 30’s of the last century when the Western countries instituted gold embargo against my country (equivalent of today’s financial measures). The political relations are also at the lowest point: many channels of communication are either destroyed or frozen. Some political steps taken by the West have a very visible nature clearly designed to insult like the establishment of the Magnitsky list, the latest doping and hackers smear campaigns not to mention the expulsions of diplomats, putting diplomatic property off limits to its legitimate owners, etc. In the foundation of this turn of events seems to lie the formula that crippled its way into the mainstream of the Western political thinking in the 90s, namely that Russia has no interests beyond its borders and should never be allowed to have them.

This maxim goes far beyond anything advanced or practiced during the Cold War. Logical consequences of it include the expansion of the NATO not only to the territory of the former Warsaw Treaty members but also to the territory of the former Soviet Union, encirclement of Russia with a system of almost 150 US military bases including ones for the BMD or tactical nuclear weapons purposes and lately the deployment of US troops and heavy armory close to Saint- Petersburg, etc.

At the same time in almost complete repetition of what happened in the early 30s with the rise of Nazi Germany is the creation of military hotbeds and chaos now on our South flank with military interventions in Iraq, Libya and now Syria (the latest development here is the decision of the former US Administration to supply antiaircraft rocket launchers to armed groups in Syria who, by the way, they admit they cannot distinguish from the terrorists). And last but not least one should not forget about the West’s sponsoring, aiding and abetting the armed coup-d’etat in the Ukraine which brought into power a radically anti-Russian regime that attempted to deny to the Ukrainian citizens their right to use their native Russian language and thus started a civil war in the East of the country. Its power base consists inter alia of the so called voluntary battalions with the Nazi insignia and ideology armed with all kinds of weapons that brand as separatists and terrorists their compatriots and witch-hunt them all over the country. Members of those groups, well represented in the Parliament, openly claim large portions of the Russian Federation like the Kuban, parts of North Caucasus, Kursk, Belgorod and Briansk regions. Even worse these battalions, now officially integrated in the Armed Forces, continue daily artillery barrages of the Donetsk and Lugansk areas despite the official ceasefire.

We demonstrate utmost restraint in the face of such policies and keep trying to resolve differences by such means as Minsk I and Minsk 2 Agreements or the forthcoming meeting in Astana on the issue of bringing peace to the suffering people of Syria. But one should understand that we are not to be pushed around. Throughout its more than a thousand year history Russia had different periods but it always rose after falling, I am sure it won’t be any difference this time around either.

Finally, let me say that only 2 days ago a new Administration came to office in Washington. I have tried to find any pronouncements by the new President on his policy concerning the СТВТ. I failed. On broader policy issues it is also not so clear what the new Administration would wish to do, maybe with the exception of the clearly declared intention to destroy the I.S. The statements of its prospective members are viewed by some as contradictory and by all means do not go much into details. New Administrations usually tend to need a few months to formulate coherent policies. We can wait. But the thing that we know is: there really is no room to go any further on the route to confrontation - it really can be too dangerous. So we hope the chosen way would be up not down.

If this turns out to be so, I hope there would be future for the CTBT and for the CTBTO PC, which could finally delete the Preparatory Commission part.

Thank you.